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NOTES
DAVIS v. DAVIS: ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES
FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER
FROZEN EMBRYOS
In vitro fertilization (IVF) enables physicians to assist infertile couples
in their efforts to conceive children.1 Since 1978, this technology has re-
sulted in the births of thousands of babies.2 IVF and related technologies
also have spawned complex legal questions that continue to challenge
courts and legislatures in determining the legal status of the embryo and
the corresponding rights and responsibilities of the genetic "parents."
Little legal guidance, in the form of caselaw or statute, exists to guide the
parties and courts in resolving disputes over frozen embryos.
In the 1992 case Davis v. Davis,4 the Tennessee Supreme Court was the
first court to decide a "custody" dispute over seven frozen embryos be-
tween the divorced genetic "parents" following the couple's divorce.5
Mr. Davis sought to prevent his former wife from having the embryos
implanted, into either her own womb or that of another woman. Mrs.
Davis sought "custody" of the embryos for another woman to gestate.6
Without a prior agreement between the parties or controlling statutory or
case law,7 the court applied a balancing test that weighed the relative
1. Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos:
Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97, 98 (1990).
2. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA.
L. REv. 437, 440 (1990). More than 5,000 births were reported in 1987-88 in the United
States. Id. at 440 n.8.
3. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 97. "It appears that state and federal legisla-
tures ... have failed to enact effective laws to provide the judicial system with guidelines
on how to decide issues connected with these new reproductive technologies." Id. See also
All Things Considered: Tennessee Court Favors Frozen Embryo (NPR radio broadcast,
June 7, 1992) [hereinafter All Things Considered] ("There are approximately 24,000 frozen
embryos in clinics across the country and there are no national guidelines on what to do
with them.").
4. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
5. Id. at 589.
6. Id. at 590.
7. Id.
[Tihe Davises... did not execute a written agreement specifying what disposition
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interests of the parties.' The court decided the case in favor of Mr. Da-
vis,9 and thus Mr. Davis will not become a parent against his will, and the
frozen embryos will either remain in storage or be destroyed.1"
This Note first provides a brief introduction to the medical technolo-
gies of IVF and cryopreservation. This Note then examines the law of
reproductive autonomy, including the rights to bear and not to bear chil-
dren. Next, this Note discusses the legal status of the embryo as consid-
ered by the courts, the legislatures, and legal commentators. This Note
then examines the Davis decision and analyzes the ramifications of the
decision in the area of IVF reproductive rights. Finally, this Note sug-
gests guidelines for the resolution of similar disputes in the future and
concludes that an agreement between the parties before IVF is under-
taken will settle respective rights in advance and obviate the need for
litigation.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
In vitro fertilization, commonly known as the "test tube baby" tech-
nique, is frequently used by infertile couples to assist in conception."
The union of a woman's ovum and a man's sperm in a petri dish produces
an embryo, and pregnancy results upon the implantation of the embryo in
the woman's uterus. 2 This seemingly simple process is fraught with ex-
pense and complications. The process can be particularly difficult for the
woman, who must undergo laparoscopy, a surgical procedure through
should be made of any unused embryos .... Moreover, there was at that time no
Tennessee statute governing such disposition ....
In addition, because of the uniqueness of the question before us, we have no
case law to guide us to a decision....
Id.
8. Id. at 591.
9. Id. at 604.
10. Id. at 604-05.
11. Robertson, supra note 2, at 440.
12. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 98. See also George P. Smith, II, Australia's
Frozen "Orphan" Embryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 27
n.2 (1985-1986).
[Tihe in vitro fertilization (IVF) process involves obtaining immature ova (or oo-
cytes) from a woman's reproductive tract, placing them in a culture medium and
then fertilizing them with sperm that itself has either been obtained normally
from a donor bank or from the candidate's husband. Within several days after
the conceptus has reached'the blastocyst stage of development, it is transplanted
(or transferred as a human embryo) into the genetic mother who produced the
egg ....
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which ova are retrieved from the ovaries.' 3 The physician often extracts
multiple ova during a single laparoscopy. Fertilization of multiple ova
allows implantation of more than one fertilized egg at a time to increase
the chance of pregnancy,' 4 or the additional embryos may be frozen and
stored for future use, thereby eliminating the need for additional
surgery.' 5
Technicians may preserve embryos not immediately implanted by using
cryopreservation, freezing the embryos in liquid nitrogen. 16 The frozen
embryos may then be stored for future attempts at pregnancy.' 7 Cry-
opreservation allows participants in IVF to minimize the burdens of the
process and maximize the chances of successful pregnancy.'"
II. PRIOR AND RELATED LAW
A. Reproductive Autonomy
Although procreation is not among the express rights enumerated in
the Constitution, it is a judicially recognized fundamental right.'9 The
right derives from the broader right of privacy2° and includes decisions to
bear2' or not to bear children.22
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court defined the right not
to bear children.23 Recognizing the physical burdens of unwanted preg-
nancy and the weighty burdens of unwanted parenthood, the Court con-
cluded that a woman's right to privacy includes the decision to terminate
13. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 98. The process also includes hormone treat-
ment, which may interfere with the woman's menstrual cycle. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 99.
17. Id. Often clinics prefer to store embryos indefinitely rather than destroying them
and being accused of abortion or murder. Id. However, the effect may be the same, since
prolonged freezing may effectively destroy the embryos, which have a limited shelf-life.
All Things Considered, supra note 3.
18. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 99 (discussing the practice by IVF practitioners
of fertilizing multiple ova and freezing those not used for later implantation).
19. Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357, 358 n.5
(1986). Procreation is one of the "basic civil rights of man." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to privacy
includes the right to abort a pre-viable conceptus).
21. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. See also Ellen Goodman, And Now... Preconceptual Agree-
ments, NEWSDAY, June 5, 1992, at 64 (noting that the right of procreational autonomy
includes the "right to have children and the right to avoid having children").
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
1994]
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a pregnancy. 24 This right is not absolute: the State has an interest in pro-
tecting the potential life of the deve*loping fetus that courts must weigh
against the woman's privacy right.25 Prior to the point of viability, the
State's interest must be balanced against the privacy and autonomy rights
of the woman, and the State's interest must not interfere with these
rights. 26 The Court concluded that the State's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus becomes compelling at viability.
27
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,2 a the United States Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that imposed
regulations on abortions.29 The law required a married woman seeking
an abortion to obtain the consent of her husband before undergoing the
procedure.3" The Court held that this provision was unconstitutional,3'
reasoning that neither the State nor the husband may interfere with the
privacy of the woman in the early stages of pregnancy.32 The Court rec-
ognized that the father had an interest in the health and development of
the fetus, 33 but refused to allow his interest to outweigh the privacy inter-
24. Id. at 154. The Court considered the validity of a Texas statute proscribing most
abortions. It held that a woman's right to privacy encompassed her "decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. The Fourteenth Amendment protected this
right of privacy from state restriction without due process. Accordingly, the Texas statute
was held unconstitutional. Id. at 164-66.
25. Id. at 154-55. The right to privacy, including the right to secure an abortion, is a
fundamental right and may be limited by the State only in furtherance of a compelling
State interest. Id. at 155.
26. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 116. "When the state's interest in the 'potential'
human life of a pre-viable entity competes with the fundamental privacy/procreative right
of a woman in whom that unborn life is implanted, the woman's privacy right prevails." Id.
27. Id. at 163. Viability, the point at which "meaningful life" is possible outside the
womb, begins at the beginning of the third trimester. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at
108. The Court held that viability marks the period when the State could restrict or pro-
hibit abortions. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. For a discussion of the right of procreative autonomy
as developed in Roe v. Wade, see Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 107-08.
28. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id. at 84-85 (setting forth the text of the statute in the Appendix to the opinion).
The relevant portion of the statute read as follows: "No abortion shall be performed prior
to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy except ... [w]ith the written consent of
the woman's spouse, unless the abortion is ... necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother." Id. at 85.
31. Id. at 69 (holding that the state may not require spousal consent as a prerequisite
to abortion).
32. Id. "[Slince the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage,
... the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to pre-
vent abortion during that same period." Id.
33. Id. (recognizing the husband's interest "in the growth and development of the
fetus").
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est of the woman.34 The Court concluded that where the interests of the
parties conflict, the woman's interest must prevail because she bears the
greater burden of an unwanted pregnancy.35 Accordingly, a husband
may not compel his pregnant wife either to bring the fetus to term or to
have an abortion;36 the procreative choice is hers alone.
37
B. The Legal Status of the Embryo
Characterizing an embryo as a person, property or something else is
critical to the determination of the embryo's legal rights, if any, and the
parents' legal rights.
1. The Embryo as "Person"
Those who believe that life begins at conception 38 recognize the em-
bryo's legal status as a person: if an embryo is a human being from con-
ception, it is entitled to full legal protection of the rights of a person.39
The legal ramifications of person status for abortion and 1VF 4° are clear:
34. Id. at 70 n.ll (noting that the effect of the invalid provision was "that the hus-
band's interest in continuing the pregnancy of his wife always outweighs any interest on
her part in terminating it" and that "[tihe State, accordingly, has granted him the right to
prevent unilaterally, and for whatever reason" the termination of the pregnancy).
35. Id. at 71.
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision,
the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and imme-
diately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.
Id.
36. Andrews, supra note 19, at 406. The woman's wishes should prevail over the
man's, because procreation is the right of the individual; she does not require his consent.
Id.
37. Id. at 401-02 (noting that respect must be given to a person's autonomy in repro-
ductive decisions).
38. John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER
REP. Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7, 10 ("[A] minority believes that a new person exists at fertiliza-
tion .... ").
39. Smith, supra note 12, at 32. "[I]f one were to acknowledge that the foetus becomes
a human being at the very instance of conception, then that entity would be entitled to the
full protection of the law and able to seek legal redress should it be injured in some way
upon actual birth." Id.
40. Techniques commonly used in IVF have the potential to cause harm to embryos.
For example. many clinics offer as an alternative to donation the destruction of unused
cryopreserved embryos. Indefinite freezing does not provide a harmless alternative to de-
struction of unused embryos; rather, "[tihis treatment indirectly destroys the embryo ...
because the frozen embryo deteriorates over time to a point at which it can no longer
survive implantation." Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 101.
1994]
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any procedure allowing or causing the destruction of an embryo is an
unacceptable violation of the embryo's liberty, and may be considered
murder.41 However, there is by no means general agreement as to when
life begins.42
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court specifically refrained from deciding
whether life begins at conception. 43 However, the Court's holding indi-
cates that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, however, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a Missouri statute declaring the
legislature's findings that life begins at conception and that unborn chil-
dren have protectable interests.45 The Court did not decide the constitu-
tionality of the findings46 but rather characterized them as value
judgments, noting that Roe leaves States free to make such value judg-
ments regarding childbirth and abortion. 7 Value judgments may vary
from state to state. For example, the state of Tennessee does not treat
embryos as persons with rights.48
Although a minority of scholars maintains that life begins at concep-
tion, most do not vest an embryo with all the rights and attributes of
41. Smith, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that if a fertilized egg has human status, its
waste or destruction amounts to death).
42. Id. "[T]here is no unyielding legal, social, ethical or religious consensus on when
life begins." Id.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Id.
44. Id. at 156-59. Noting that "no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 157, the Court concluded "that
the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."
Id. at 158. See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 568 n.13 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that even Justices dissenting
in Roe agreed with the characterization of "fetus" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes);
Andrews, supra note 19, at 368 (noting that Roe v. Wade failed to find any possible prena-
tal application of the word "person" in the Constitution).
45. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. at 498-501. The action chal-
lenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the statute, including the preamble,
which declared, "the life of each human being begins at conception." Id. at 501.
46. Id. at 506-07. For a discussion of the constitutionality of state statutes presuming
that life begins at conception, see Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 108-09.
47. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. "Roe v. Wade 'implies no limitation on the authority of a
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."' Id. (quoting Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
48. Robertson, supra note 38, at 7.
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personhood.4 9 Regardless of whether life begins at conception, the law
may not consider the entity created at conception a legal person.50 The
more prevalent position, advocated by the 1979 Ethics Advisory Board of
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, recog-
nizes that the human embryo is entitled to "profound respect," but not
necessarily to the legal and moral rights inherent to personhood.5 ' While
the developing embryo possesses certain qualities generally attributed to
persons, in the aggregate the personhood approach is inadequate as a
legal framework for analyzing the embryo's legal status. 2
2. The Embryo as "Property"
An alternative to the personhood approach is the recognition of the
embryo as personal property. 3 This position is widely accepted by ex-
perts in reproductive technology.54 Classifying embryos as property de-
scribes the interest of the "owners" in controlling their use.55
Accordingly, the gamete providers56 are considered the owners because
they decide the embryos' fate. 7
In one of the few reported cases implicating dispositional authority
over frozen embryos, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia presumed a couple the owners of embryos created
49. Id. at 10. "While a minority believes that a new person exists at fertilization, most
people would disagree that the earliest stages of postfertilized human life, which consist of
four to eight undifferentiated cells that are not yet biologically individual, are themselves
persons or entities with rights." Id.
50. John A. Robertson, Davis: An Unwarranted Conclusion, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov./Dec. 1989, at 11, 11. "[G]enetic uniqueness and potential to develop into a newborn
infant does not mean that a human entity - the preimplantation embryo - is already a
'child' or 'human being' with rights and interests of its own." Id.
51. Smith, supra note 12, at 30.
52. Andrews, supra note 19, at 368.
53. Id. at 366-67 (discussing "property approach to the embryo"). This approach in-
volves characterizing the embryo as the personal property of its progenitors to determine
the legal rights of the respective parties. Id.
54. See id. at 366 (citing Ethical Statement of In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 12 (1984) ("[Cloncepti are the property of the donors.")).
55. Andrews, supra note 19, at 366-67.
56. The gamete providers include the man who furnished the sperm and the woman
who furnished the ovum.
57. Robertson, supra note 38, at 9. "[Tlhe terms 'ownership' or 'property' refer to the
locus and not the scope of decisional authority over embryos." Id. The decision-making
power clearly rests with the gamete providers, but "their decisional authority can be lim-
ited, so that their 'property' or 'ownership' in embryos is less than their ownership of other
kinds of property." Id.
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from their gametes.5 8 The property approach is not entirely satisfactory,
however, because for embryos to be recognized as personal property,
they must have economic value.5 9 In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital of
New York,6" the court rejected a claim for economic loss due to the
wrongful destruction of embryos by a hospital; instead, damages were
awarded for emotional distress.6 Therefore unless economic value of
embryos is recognized, embryos cannot be considered property,6 2 and
thus the property approach is an imperfect framework for analyzing the
legal status of the developing embryo.63 While it fairly describes the con-
trol exercised over the embryo by the parent/owners, the property ap-
proach may not accurately recognize the embryo's value.
Clearly neither the personhood approach nor the property approach
sufficiently describes the unique legal status of the human embryo.' The
embryo embodies characteristics of both person and property; the law
must recognize this dualism and treat the embryo accordingly.
III. DA VS V. DAVIS
A. Factual Background
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis, a married couple residing in
Tennessee, decided to use IVF to try to conceive a child together after
encountering a series of reproductive difficulties. 65 They employed mul-
tiple ova laparoscopy and cryopreservation to minimize the pain and ex-
pense of multiple ova extractions from Mrs. Davis.6 6 The couple never
58. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (presuming, without discus-
sion, that the gamete providers had a property interest in the embryos). See Robertson,
supra note 38, at 10 ("Jones v. York [sic] ... assumes without question that embryos are the
'property' of the gamete providers .... ).
59. Smith, supra note 12, at 31. "[F]or embryos to be considered personal property,
they must be recognized in the law as having an economic value." Id.
60. No. 74-3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
61. Id. at 4. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 367-68 (discussing the facts and circum-
stances of Del Zio). But see Smith, supra note 12, at 35 n.39 (citing Del Zio as recognizing
the loss of an interest akin to personal property "in the wrongful destruction of an ex-
tracorporeal embryo").
62. Smith, supra note 12, at 31.
63. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 368 ("[T]he property approach has not been ac-
cepted as a satisfactory framework within which to analyze the legal status of the embryo
. . . . 11).
64. Andrews, supra note 19, at 366 (noting that the law classifies the embryo as neither
person nor property).
65. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
66. Id. at 592.
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signed a consent form for the clinic to perform the procedure and no
agreement existed between the couple or between the couple and the
clinic as to the disposition of preserved embryos in the event of contin-
gency such as divorce, death or a disagreement.67 Mrs. Davis did not
become pregnant through the IVF procedure.68
Mr. Davis filed for divorce in February 1989 and the disposition of the
frozen embryos was the sole issue of contention in the property settle-
ment of the divorce. 69 Mrs. Davis originally sought "custody" of the em-
bryos so that she could bear a child herself, while Mr. Davis sought to
prevent her from doing so to avoid the burdens of genetic parenthood.70
By the time the action reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Mrs. Davis
sought to donate the embryos to another couple for implantation. Mr.
Davis continued to oppose the use of the embryos by anyone and sought
to have them destroyed.7"
B. Procedural History
The trial court held that life begins at conception and that the embryos
constituted human beings upon fertilization. 72 The court reasoned that
because it was in the best interests of the "children" (the frozen embryos)
to be brought to term, it granted custody to Mrs. Davis so that she could
have them implanted.73 The Tennessee Court of Appeals recognized Mr.
Davis' right to avoid unwanted parenthood, and the lack of any compel-
ling State interest in ordering implantation. The appellate court con-
cluded that the parties shared an interest in the embryos and remanded
the case to the trial court ordering that the Davises share dispositional
authority.74 Mrs. Davis appealed this decision, and the Tennessee




70. Id. at 589. "Any disposition which results in the gestation of the preembryos
would impose unwanted parenthood on him, with all of its possible financial and psycho-
logical consequences." Id. at 603.
71. Id. at 590.
72. See id. at 589.
73. See id.
74. See id. This ruling presented obvious difficulties: "They couldn't split what they
had joined together. He couldn't take back his sperm. She couldn't retrieve her ovum.
Nor could they share custody of the pre-embryos: one week in her freezer, the next in his."
Goodman, supra note 22, at 64.
75. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
We granted review, not because we disagree with the basic legal analysis utilized
1994]
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C. The Decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court
1. The "Person" vs. "Property" Dichotomy
The Tennessee Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the
question "whether the preembryos in this case should be considered 'per-
sons' or 'property' in the contemplation of the law."'76 The supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that embryos are not "persons" under
Tennessee law. 7 The court based its determination on a state statute that
allowed an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus, 78 and on case
law that held that "a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the
statute."79 The court also relied on Tennessee criminal statutes to sup-
port the notion that Tennessee does not treat an embryo as a "person."
80
The court further noted that the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Roe v. Wade and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services do not recog-
nize the personhood of a fetus until viability, a "stage of fetal develop-
ment [that] is far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from
that of the four- to eight-cell preembryos in this case. "81
Although the court rejected the trial court's finding that the embryos
are persons from the point of conception, 2 the court also rejected the
court of appeals' treatment of embryos as marital property.83 Relying on
the ethical standards of the American Fertility Society, 84 the court con-
by the intermediate court, but because of the obvious importance of the case in
terms of the development of law regarding the new reproductive technologies,
and because decision of the Court of Appeals does not give adequate guidance to
the trial court in the event the parties cannot agree.
Id.
76. Id. at 594.
77. Id.
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
79. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-95 (citing Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990' Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990)).
80. Id. at 595. Tennessee law protects viable fetuses from crimes to the person such as
assault or murder, but does not include abortion among the protections. TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-13-107, 39-13-210 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
81. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,
529 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
82. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
83. Id. at 595-96. "[B]y citing to York v. Jones but failing to define precisely the 'inter-
est' that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos, the Court of Appeals
has left the implication that it is in the nature of a property interest." Id. at 596.
84. Id. at 596-97.
[T~he preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but
not the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due greater respect
than other human tissue because of its potential to become a person and because
of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a per-
1994] Davis v. Davis 503
cluded that embryos possess attributes of both persons and property, but
may properly be classified as neither. The court stated that embryos are a
hybrid of property and person:
We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either
"persons" or "property," but occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
human life. It follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and
Junior Davis have in the preembryos in this case is not a true
property interest. However, they do have an interest in the na-
ture of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making
authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the
scope of policy set by law.
85
2. The Contract Theory
Although no agreement existed between the parties in the case, the
court indulged in extensive dicta regarding the importance of prior agree-
ments to avoid and resolve such disputes over frozen embryos,86 indicat-
ing that it would enforce such agreements.8 7 The court then considered a
theory of implied contract between the parties by virtue of their partici-
pation in the IVF program.88 The court rejected this theory and con-
cluded that furnishing gametes for IVF should not be considered an
irrevocable commitment to reproduction because no meeting of the
minds occurred as to the disposition of the embryos under these
contingencies.
89
son, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet estab-
lished as developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
Id. at 596 (quoting AMERICAN FERTILITY Soc'Y, REPORT ON ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (June 1990) at 34S-35S).
85. Id. at 597.
86. Id.
87. Id. "[An agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the
event of contingencies (such as the death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial
reversals, or abandonment of the program) should be presumed valid and should be en-
forced as between the progenitors." Id.
88. Id. at 598.
It might be argued in this case that the parties had an implied contract to
reproduce using in vitro fertilization, that Mary Sue Davis relied on that agree-
ment in undergoing IVF procedures, and that the court should enforce an implied
contract against Junior Davis, allowing Mary Sue to dispose of the preembryos in
a manner calculated to result in reproduction.
Id.
89. Id.
The problem with such an analysis is that there is no indication in the record that
disposition in the event of contingencies other than Mary Sue Davis's pregnancy
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3. The Right of Procreational Autonomy
The court next discussed at length the right of procreational autonomy
based on the right of privacy under both the federal and Tennessee con-
stitutions.90 The court concluded that the right of procreational auton-
omy comprises two rights: the rights to bear and not to bear children.9
These two rights conflict in the context of disputes over extracorporeal
embryos, where no issue of bodily autonomy on the part of the woman
will automatically outweigh any interest on the part of the man.92 The
court concluded that in the abortion context, the State may assert its in-
terest in protecting potential life after the first trimester; however, in the
IVF context, the early developmental stage of the embryos precludes any
State interest.93
4. Balancing the Parties' Interests
The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test bal-
ances the competing interests of the parties and assigns relative weight to
the burdens and interests of each party in the dispute.94 The court first
analyzed the extreme psychological burdens of unwanted parenthood on
Mr. Davis, particularly taking into account his upbringing and personal
feelings about fatherhood.9 The court then considered Mrs. Davis' po-
was ever considered by the parties, or that Junior Davis intended to pursue repro-
duction outside the confines of a continuing marital relationship with Mary Sue.
We therefore decline to decide this case on the basis of implied contract or the
reliance doctrine.
Id.
90. Id. at 598-600; U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV; TENN. CoNsT., art. I §§ 1-3, 7, 8, 19, 27.
"Here, the specific individual freedom in dispute is the right to procreate. In terms of the
Tennessee state constitution, we hold that the right of procreation is a vital part of an
individual's right to privacy. Federal law is to the same effect." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
91. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. "For the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note
that, whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy
is composed of two rights of equal significance - the right to procreate and the right to
avoid procreation." Id.
92. Id. "The equivalence of and inherent tension between these two interests are no-
where more evident than in the context of in vitro fertilization. None of the concerns
about a woman's bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling
abortion decisions is applicable here." Id.
93. Id. at 602. "[Tlhere is no state interest in these preembryos which could suffice to
overcome the interests of the gamete-providers." Id.
94. Id. at 603.
95. Id. at 603-604.
Beginning with the burden imposed on Junior Davis, we note that the conse-
quences are obvious. Any disposition which results in the gestation of the preem-
bryos would impose unwanted parenthood on him, with all of its possible
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tential burden of being denied the right to donate the embryos so that
another woman might bring them to term.96 The court concluded that
Mr. Davis' burden was greater:
[W]e can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis's interest in dona-
tion is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoid-
ing parenthood. If she were allowed to donate these
preembryos, he would face a lifetime of either wondering about
his parental status or knowing about his parental status but hav-
ing no control over it.97
The court suggested that its decision may have been different if Mrs.
Davis had argued that the embryos were her only reasonable means for
reproduction.98
D. Conclusion
The court concluded its opinion by establishing a framework for resolv-
ing similar disputes in the future:
[D]isputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by
in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the
preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascer-
tained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concern-
ing disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement
exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not
using the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood
by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no
other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor
of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be consid-
ered. However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos
intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting
financial and psychological consequences. The impact that this unwanted
parenthood would have on Junior Davis can only be understood by considering
his particular circumstances, as revealed in the record.
Id. at 603.
96. Id. at 604. "Refusal to permit donation of the preembryos would impose on her
the burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and
that the preembryos to which she contributed genetic material would never become chil-
dren .... [T]his is not an insubstantial emotional burden .. " Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. "The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the preem-
bryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable
means." Id.
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party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.99
Applying that standard to the circumstances of this case, the court held
in favor of Mr. Davis and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.'0°
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Reproductive Autonomy
1. Rejection of Personhood Approach
The Tennessee Supreme Court properly considered and rejected the
trial court's theory that life begins at conception and the necessary impli-
cation that an embryo is a person with legal rights. 01 If upheld, that
theory would have impacted profoundly the field of reproductive
medicine by limiting the available options of IVF participants once an
embryo has been fertilized and by providing legal support for antiabor-
tion arguments.'0 2 The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision garnered
much attention and debate in the abortion arena.10 3 Civil rights advo-
cates considered the repudiation of the theory of conception as the begin-
ning of life and the starting point for legal recognition of personhood a
welcome correction to the dangerous and unfounded decision of the trial
court.' o4
99. Id. Note the remarkable similarity between the quoted passage and that in Rob-
ertson, supra note 38, at 12:
Until the law prescribes otherwise, disputes over frozen embryos should be re-
solved first by looking to the joint wishes of the couple, and if they are not avail-
able or are unable to agree, to prior instructions which they gave for disposition
of those embryos. If no instructions exist, we must then compare the relative
burdens on each party of using or not using the embryos in question to see which
party should prevail.
100. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
101. See Robertson, supra note 50, at 11. The trial judge's "conclusion that four-celled
preimplantation human embryos are 'children' and 'human beings' is unprecedented and
unwarranted. It has no discernible basis in common law precedents nor [sic] in Tennessee
law (which recognizes a separate legal interest in prenatal human life only at viability)."
Id.
102. Cynthia Mitchell, Tennessee's Top Court to Hear Case of 7 Embryos; Deciding
Their Fate an Issue in Divorce, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 9, 1992, at A3. The trial court's
holding "that 'life begins at conception' . . . would likely have had a chilling effect on
fertilization programs and fetal research and provide support for anti-abortion arguments."
Id.
103. A Heated Frozen Custody Battle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 15, 1992, at 16.
The decision "had resonance in the abortion debate. Feminists were pleased that a par-
ent's right to choose on a childbirth issue won the day; abortion foes complained that the
ruling favored ending a potential life." Id.
104. See Duren Cheek, Embryo Ruling: Man Can't Be Forced to Be a Father, Gannett
News Service, June 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gannett News Service File
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2. Reaffirmation of Procreative Autonomy
The Davis decision reaffirmed the right of procreative autonomy, ex-
pressly finding it a part of the privacy rights of both the federal and Ten-
nessee constitutions." 5 While the decision. was confined to IVF and the
dispositional authority over frozen embryos, it may be interpreted as con-
firming a broader right to procreative decisionmaking. 1'
Because the Davis decision favored a man's procreative rights over a
woman's, some feared that courts would allow a man a veto or superior
power over a woman's procreative rights, which have already received
much scrutiny and limitation.0 7 While increasing regulation of a wo-
man's right to an abortion and the recognition of greater rights in procre-
ative decisions for men seems inconsistent,0 8 the Davis court's
recognition of the right of an individual, male or female, to control his or
her reproduction should allay concern.'0 9 The Davis decision enhances
the reproductive freedom of both sexes."'
(noting comment of Heidi Weinburg, executive director of the ACLU in Tennessee, that
the decision "dispels the 'chilling effect' of a trial court ruling in the case that life begins at
conception.").
105. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-600 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993). Grounding the right in the Tennessee constitution ensures that any erosion of the
rights of privacy and procreative choice in the federal courts need not imperil those rights
in Tennessee. Attorney Sees Abortion "Direction" in Embryo Ruling, UPI, June 2, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Charles Clifford, attorney for Mr.
Davis).
106. Ronald Smothers, Court Gives Ex-Husband Rights on Use of Embryos, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1992, at Al. The decision "seemed to favor a person's right to choose
whether to have a child." Id.
107. See Goodman, supra note 22, at 64 ("As women's reproductive rights are con-
tracting, men's rights seem to be expanding.").
108. See Smothers, supra note 106, at Al, A16. Arthur L. Caplan, director of the
Center for Biomedical Ethics, University of Minnesota, indicated that the apparent incon-
sistency "raises the question as to whether other courts would be willing to compel women
to do what this court is not willing to compel a man to do." Id.
109. See All Things Considered, supra note 3. Pat King, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center, explains:
Some have been upset by the court's holding because in this case it was the father
who did not want to be a parent, and they see it as emphasizing fathers' rights and
male control over females .... I think a better interpretation is that the court is
saying that either a man or a woman who has started down this road to reproduc-
tion, who changes his or her mind can do so and not be forced to-be a parent...
[unless] the other person can't procreate by any other means.
Id.
110. See Goodman, supra note 22, at 64 ("[A] man's right to privacy seems to reinforce
a woman's. If he can't be forced into fatherhood by the state, surely she can't be forced
into motherhood.").
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3. Application to IVF and Frozen Embryos
A discussion of procreative rights in the context of disputes over ex-
tracorporeal embryos presents unique considerations: unlike disputes in-
volving a pregnant woman, disputes over extracorporeal embryos do not
implicate concern for the woman's bodily autonomy."' The notion of
''sweat equity," that the woman has the greater interest because she bears
the greater physical contribution and burden, does not apply. 1 2 Accord-
ingly, in IVF, the difference in physical burdens of men and women does
not justify automatically favoring the woman's interests." 3 Where a wo-
man's bodily autonomy is not implicated, her procreative interests may
be weighed against those of the man." 4 The choice is no longer solely in
the province of the woman; the recognized right is that of the individual.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in the contra-
ception and abortion cases that recognize the rearing and gestational bur-
dens of unwanted parenthood," 15 the Davis court recognized and gave
significant weight to the psychological burdens of unwanted genetic
parenthood." 6 The burdens of unwanted reproduction may include risks
of financial liability and a significant psychosocial impact."
7
The Davis case presented for the first time the two rights of procreative
autonomy, the right to procreate and the right not to procreate, in ten-
sion." ' These rights are at odds in the IVF setting. The court properly
applied a balancing test to resolve the competing interests.
1 9
111. Robertson, supra note 38, at 11-12.
112. Id. at 7.
113. Id. The decision concerning an extracorporeal embryo "is unlike the abortion de-
cision since honoring the man's wishes will not impose a physical burden on the woman
and thus there is reason to give equal weight to his desires." Andrews, supra note 19, at
407.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
116. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993). Unwilling genetic parenthood has been characterized as "traumatic" and akin to
"psychological amputation." Andrews, supra note 19, at 405 n.260.
117. Robertson, supra note 38, at 8.
118. Goodman, supra note 22, at 64 ("The real conflict is between two rights to
'procreational autonomy.' The right to have children and the right to avoid having
children.").
119. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. "If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests
of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed." Id. See Browne &
Hynes, supra note 1, at 116 ("a balancing test is appropriate for the resolution of such
conflicts to prevent people from interfering with each other's rights").
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B. Guidelines for Resolving Future Disputes
1. Legislation
Because of the dearth of legislation and precedent controlling IVF,
there are scant guidelines available for the resolution of disputes arising
out of this "new" reproductive technology. 120 The whole area of IVF re-
mains virtually uncharted by state and federal legislatures.12' A dire
need exists for a legislative determination to guide the judiciary in the
resolution of issues arising out of IVF. 22 Some suggest that the failure of
the legislature to provide adequate guidelines in this area results from
IVF's controversial nature and proximity to the abortion debate. 123 The
Davis case highlighted the importance of guidelines for resolving such
disputes; state legislatures should adopt relevant measures to facilitate
such cases in the future.' 24 Had Tennessee a statute requiring embryo
transfer whenever possible, such guidance would have facilitated a simple
(but different) solution to the Davis case.' 25
2. Preconceptual Agreements
The court correctly considered and rejected the theory that an implied
contract existed between the parties by virtue of their participation in
IVF that would have bound them to complete the reproductive process
with the embryos. 126 As the court recognized, provision of gametes for
IVF does not necessarily imply an agreement by the parties to follow
through with parenthood, because many unexpected contingencies could
arise that significantly alter the ability and desire to pursue
parenthood. 127
120. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 107 ("Judges... have virtually no guidance for
resolving embryo issues").
121. Id. at 103-04. "[Flederal and state legislatures have been virtually silent on issues
affecting pre-implanted embryos.... Neither federal nor state governments have enumer-
ated the legal rights of a frozen embryo and its parents." Id. at 104.
122. Id. at 97 ("[Sltate and federal legislatures ... have failed to enact effective laws to
provide the judicial system with guidelines on how to decide issues connected with these
new reproductive technologies.").
123. All Things Considered, supra note 3.
124. Browne & Hynes, supra note 1, at 122 (urging state legislatures to adopt uniform
legislation to guide courts in resolving disputes relating to IVF and frozen human em-
bryos). For a discussion of the constitutionality of such statutes, see Robertson, supra note
38, at 10.
125. Robertson, supra note 38, at 10.
126. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
127. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. "[Clreation of embryos alone should not be taken as an
irrevocable commitment to reproduction." Robertson, supra note 38, at 7. But see Browne
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The dicta in the opinion stressing the importance of prior agreements by
the parties highlights the need for such agreements to resolve future dis-
putes. I28 Unlike coital conception, IVF provides the unique opportunity
for couples to provide in advance for the disposition of the embryos in
the event of such contingencies as death, divorce or disagreement of the
parties. Before the embryo is implanted in the woman, the couple's in-
tent could be determined and the agreement could be enforced, because
no bodily or gestational burdens are implicated.' 29 Under Davis, such
agreements would be determinative. States should require couples to
sign a preconceptual agreement as a prerequisite to participation in
IVF.1 3 0
3. The Davis Framework
The Davis opinion sets out a workable framework for resolving future
disputes over frozen embryos. The framework considers the intent of the
parties as expressed in a prior agreement. Absent such an agreement, the
framework weighs the relative interests and burdens involved in achiev-
ing or avoiding procreation, including the financial and psychological
consequences of unwanted parenthood, the emotional trauma of destroy-
ing unused embryos, and the ability of the party seeking implantation to
bear children in the future.' 3 In an area of scant legal guidance for the
resolution of complex disputes involving fundamental rights, the frame-
work sets a valuable legal precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
As awareness of the advantages of pre-IVF agreements increases and
their use becomes widespread, there will no longer be a need for the Da-
vis framework to resolve disputes over frozen embryos, because their dis-
position will commonly be decided in advance. However, the Davis
& Hynes, supra note 1, at 117 (arguing that persons who have created gametes outside the
womb have freely exercised their procreative right and have assumed the risks of such
decisions).
128. See Goodman, supra note 22, at 64 ("[I]t's the preconceptual agreement that
counts.").
129. Robertson, supra note 38, at 11-12.
130. Id. at 10 (recommending that couples be required to declare before creation and
storage what is to be done with the embryos in the event of disagreement, divorce, death,
or other contingency).
131. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. The court's "ruling laid out guide-
lines for childless couples seeking to use in vitro fertilization." Smothers, supra note 106,
at A16 (quoting Mr. Davis).
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decision remains significant as a reaffirmation of the procreative freedom
of the individual, male or female. As reproductive technology advances,
the law must keep pace, continuing to recognize as fundamental the au-
tonomy of the individual in his or her procreative choices.
Stephanie J. Owen

